In the Web 2.0 age, mass media disseminates the disinformation of companies and exerts considerable influence. How to manage this trend in a timely and effective fashion in this big data era has become difficult. In this study, we delve into this issue by trying to identify the core disseminators in the dissemination process. We propose the concept of a disinformation channel and quantitatively analyse these company-related disinformation channels among media outlets. By empirically analysing 4,689 disinformation news values and 330 channels in 2018, we reveal that the disinformation values and negative news values are characteristics. We also build automatic identification models to identify these channels from the media combined with machine learning algorithms. Our study sheds light on disinformation, thus providing managers with an empirical basis upon which to analyse the media and help them address the disinformation problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Media outlets usually write company-related news. As media have enjoyed high levels of public trust and credibility [1] , [2] , these news outlets usually speak with authority and exert considerable influence on different aspects of a company, such as stocks [3] , brand attitude [4] , and brand communication strategy [5] , [6] . Because of this, some actors will use media as a weapon. They employ media to write disinformation to mislead people and attack their competitors deliberately. As disinformation often consists of correct information, its influence may even have an amplifier effect [7] , [8] . Therefore, managing the media related to disinformation dissemination may have significance for a company.
In the beginning, this media creating dissemination behaviour was not taken seriously by managers or scholars, although the phenomenon of media outlets creating and disseminating disinformation had been existed since World War I with information disorder [1] . At that time, with
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Lu An. few media and news outlets, occurrences of disinformation were rare. Finding the media that created or disseminated disinformation was not hard. These media could be managed by setting the journalistic norms of objectivity and balance [1] using the definition of disinformation and setting related punitive action. The management was relatively simple.
However, this situation has been changed with the coming age of Web 2.0. Today, the internet has lowered the cost of entry to create and disseminate news [9] . A number of media outlets have rejected journalistic norms and have disseminated disinformation. It requires extreme amounts of resources or is impossible to use the former strategies which managing and checking them one by one. Initially/originally, this problem was related to political issues or social issues [7] , [10] . Now, it has turned to companies.
When facing this media creating disinformation problem, the researches focus on two perspectives. The widespread studies try to detect the disinformation, like other information disorder detection [11] , [12] . However, the number of disinformation is massive. The types of disinformation is variety. And the format of disinformation is more complicated. So, it is doubtful that whether it is a proper way to focus on the automatic disinformation detection method. The other perspective is focusing on the media. Unfortunately, studies on media outlets who create disinformation focus on analysing the reasons for this behaviour and assessing the impact qualitatively [13] . No studies that automatically identify these media outlets have been conducted. Moreover, existing studies on the media of disinformation are related to political or social issues, no matter the studies of disinformation detection, or the media qualitative analysis [14] . Despite the importance of disinformation affecting companies, this issue has not been addressed.
Thus, we attempt to fill this gap. We propose the idea of managing the core disseminators. For purpose of spending resources wisely, a company only needs to identify and control the dominant dissemination media, according to the 80/20 principle that most roles in information dissemination are played by only a few core disseminators. Compared to the perspective of disinformation detection, this idea is more cost-effective to company. It is due to that although the number of disinformation we need to deal with is limitless, the number of media is limited. Also, it fits the idea of solving the problem from sources [15] , [16] .
Therefore, the core problem is timely identification and differentiation of the core disseminators in the disinformation dissemination process from a vast number of media outlets. We need a way to identify which media is behind the promotion of disinformation communication. To achieve this goal that analyse and identify the core media outlets in the disinformation dissemination process, we propose the concept of a disinformation channel. And it refers to media outlets which have influence online and create or retweet disinformation intentionally. In addition, we focus on quantitatively analysing and automatically identifying these companyrelated disinformation channels among media. In the study, we propose that disinformation values and negative news values are characteristics of disinformation channels. Using the disinformation data about companies in 2018, we present empirical evidence through explanatory analysis. We also reveal that the negative news created or retweeted by media outlets and company-related ones are both characteristics of disinformation channels. Second, using the disinformation values and negative news values, combined with machine learning algorithms, we build automatic identification models to identify these channels. The results support the feasibility of this idea. Last, on the basis of explanatory analysis results and automatic identification models, we provide suggestions for companies to manage and control disinformation channels among media.
Our study helps companies understand, manage and control the source of the disinformation. In addition, our study may help companies address these problems from the beginning or the key node of the dissemination. Furthermore, our study helps in confronting the disinformation problem at the origin and sheds light on disinformation management.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the background of this study. The theoretical models of our framework are also provided. Section 3 presents the methodology used in our study, including explanatory and predictive analyses. Section 4 focuses on the results. Section 5 discusses our findings, and Section 6 provides our conclusion.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK A. DISINFORMATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MEDIA
Disinformation can be defined as inaccurate or manipulated information content that is spread intentionally [7] , [17] . It can also be described as harmful information that is purposely spread to deceive people [1] . The phenomenon of media creating and disseminating disinformation derives from the information disorder in World War I [1] . At that time, the problem focused on the widespread use of propaganda and the perspective of corporate public relations. As the dissemination of news was controlled by just a few legacy media outlets for a long time, this problem could be solved by strengthening the journalistic norms of objectivity and balance. Managing these few media outlets led to managing the disinformation problem. Thus, this problem was not difficult to overcome, and the relevant literature focuses mostly on defining disinformation rather than solving it [18] - [20] , determining the effects of disinformation [19] , [21] , analysing the reasons why media engage in disinformation, and providing some conceptual analysis [19] , [22] , [23] .
Since internet technologies have lowered the cost of entry, more and more media outlets that reject journalistic norms have appeared and undermined the business models of legacy media outlets that had enjoyed trust and credibility. The origin became more obscure [7] , fact-checking became more difficult [8] , the definition of disinformation became more complicated [24] , and the function of the media and disinformation became more powerful [25] , [26] . The traditional approach to managing this problem was no longer effective, and the disinformation problem became increasingly serious. In 2016, the year of the U.S. federal elections, disinformation had hit its stride. Scholars cohesively realized the importance of addressing this disinformation problem and attempted to explain this phenomenon [7] , [10] in the social and radical perspective, state the prevalence and impact of disinformation [5] , [17] , [27] , and analyse the difficulty of solving this problem [28] , [29] . They still held that solving this disinformation problem should focus on the media and offered potential solutions such as constructing media criticism and epistemic reorientation [15] and empowering the ability of evaluation to assess the media and their news [16] . During this time, studies on the media of disinformation in this big data era gave some descriptive analysis of the media and disinformation, but research about the media that produce and disseminate disinformation is very scarce.
The main difficulty of solving the media problem is no longer just punitive measurement; the timely identification of the media outlet has become the most important aspect. However, no identification method can help us solve this problem.
B. IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE DISSEMINATORS OF INFORMATION DISORDERS
Like the disinformation problem, when dealing with other information disorders, managing and controlling the disseminators is the effective solution. No matter whether it is fake news, misinformation, or rumour, the literature exists to explore and identify the disseminators to achieve the management and control of these information disorders.
The identification method can be summarized by two streams. Extant literature indicates a variety of studies relating identification work using automatic detection tools such as deep learning [30] and machine learning [31] . Within these studies, researchers mined the characteristics of disseminators and used these features with algorithms to achieve detection [4] - [6] . Usually, these methods can detect the disseminators with obvious characteristics such as bots [31] , Sybil nodes [32] and sock puppets [33] . Another stream of research focuses on a complex network analysis. These studies used network analysis such as a greedy algorithm [34] - [36] to find the core disseminators and provide control methods.
Recent studies have shown that the two streams of identification methods can affect disseminator detection, but existing methods cannot be used directly to solve the disinformation problem. The method using complex network analysis requires a relatively complete network framework. Thus, these methods are always used on social network data, but the media have their own websites and are usually separated, and there is no obvious network between these media. The methods using characteristic mining and automatic detection usually need the obvious characteristic, while the media disseminating disinformation do not. Collectively, these two streams of methods provide valuable insights. Drawing on them, we could focus on the core dissemination media, mine the characteristics of these core media, and identify the detection method using an algorithm.
C. DISINFORMATION CHANNEL
Herein, we define our study object. In this paper, we do not focus on all media outlets that create or disseminate disinformation. In this big data era, a number of online media outlets exist. The same media company can continuously create different disinformation through different media outlets by simply using a different IP address, but these media cannot dictate the dissemination of the disinformation. It is the influential media online that decide the dissemination by retweeting or promoting the disinformation. These influential media cannot change their IP addresses. By managing these media, we can control the dissemination of the disinformation. Second, as for influential media, not all media that create or retweet the disinformation are our objects. As the types of disinformation are complicated, not all disinformation can be accurately identified. Some media unintentionally exhibit disinformation-related behaviours. These media are not our objects because there is no need to manage them.
We refer to this as the disinformation channel, that is, the media which have online influence and create or retweet disinformation intentionally. We call this media the disinformation channel and propose to use a disinformation variable and negative news variable to characterize the disinformation channel.
1) DISINFORMATION VARIABLE
Drawing on related studies of source credibility [4] , [37] , simple cues determine the credibility of a source, and we can evaluate the source with assessment of the news [38] , [39] . Therefore, we can evaluate the media with an assessment of disinformation. The number of incidents of disinformation can represent the media's willingness to post the disinformation, and the sentiment of the disinformation can represent the orientation. According to the definition of a disinformation channel, creating or retweeting disinformation is its purpose. Therefore, the willingness and the orientation represent the probability that media outlet is a disinformation channel. We propose that we can identify the disinformation channel from the media through the disinformation:
H1: The disinformation variable is related to the identification of the disinformation channel.
2) NEGATIVE NEWS VARIABLE
We illustrate the relation between negative news and a disinformation channel from the perspective of definition and purpose. As the intentionally created or retweeted disinformation is a purpose of a disinformation channel and disinformation usually harms the company, we propose that the disinformation channel usually tries to manipulate news to injure the company. Regarding the manipulation methods used in manipulating the news, the methods include posting biased messages and different kinds of news with other accounts. Negative news like this can hurt business and is more likely used to encourage competition [40] . By combining the purpose and manipulation method of the disinformation channel and the effect of negative news, we propose that the effect of negative news fits the purpose of the disinformation channel. Thus, we propose the following:
H2: The negative news variable is related to the identification of the disinformation channel.
In summary, we propose that the disinformation variable and negative news variable are related to the identification of the disinformation channel and can be regarded as the characteristics of the channel. Next, we will perform an empirical analysis to prove these hypotheses and build automatic identification models of the disinformation channel using significant variables.
III. METHOD A. DATA
To explore these ideas, we cooperated with Zhiwei Data, a Chinese top intelligence service company. Zhiwei serves top Chinese companies such as Jingdong and Meituan. It collects real-time information related to these companies and provides analysis and warning services. Together with these top companies, Zhiwei manually cuts out information noise and collects precise information about these companies based on consultations. Together, with Zhiwei, we collected disinformation from news in 2018 to form the database. The specific steps are as follows: First, together with Zhiwei, we selected disinformation from the news. During this step, judging whether the news is disinformation or not must take the related companies into consideration. We discussed the companies Zhiwei served and judged the disinformation. We identified 4,689 instances of disinformation from news in 2018. Second, on the basis of the disinformation, we collected related information about this news. Moreover, we collected information about the media that created or retweeted this news for analysis using Zhiwei tools. Using these data, we counted and computed the independent variables. Table 1 provides the descriptive analysis.
B. VARIABLES 1) DISINFORMATION CHANNELS
We collect the media that created or retweeted the disinformation. Using the data in the database, discussing with related companies together with Zhiwei, we judge whether the media is the disinformation channel of the companies. We confirm a total of 330 channels. We use the variable, Dis_channel, to be dependent variable. And it code as 1 to indicate the media is a disinformation channel of the companies or 0 otherwise. In this database, 73 media (22.12%) are disinformation channels.
2) DISINFORMATION VARIABLES
Based on the data in the database above, we count and compute the disinformation variables.
a: VOLUME OF DISINFORMATION (Dis_Vol)
We count the disinformation that the media created and retweeted related to the companies. The numbers are the results. As the volume of disinformation is the most intuitional judgement about whether a media is the disinformation channel, we took this variable as the control variable.
b: SCORE OF DISINFORMATION (Dis_Score)
As to the news, we first score them according to the standard: Score 3: The news is completely fake news, and is used to lead the public opinion to a wrong direction. Score 2: The news is half true and half fake news, and is used to lead the public opinion to a wrong direction.
Score 1: The news is true, but it uses a purposed description to lead the public opinion to a wrong direction.
Combined with the disinformation score and the volume, we compute the score of disinformation as:
where, Score news : the score of disinformation; n d : the volume of disinformation of the media.
c: VOLUME OF DISINFORMATION EVENT (DE_Vol)
We explore the events they belong to and count the disinformation events that the media created and retweet disinformation in. The numbers are the results.
3) NEGATIVE NEWS VARIABLES
We collect the news that the media in the database created or retweeted. The steps are as below: First, we discuss with the companies that related to the disinformation and confirm the keywords about companies. Using these keywords, we collect the news that contained the keywords in the titles. Second, we manually cut out the noises. Moreover, based on the 8020 principles [41] , we cut out the news that didn't matter. At last, we manually judge the sentiments of the pick news into three classification: positive, neutral and negative. All these procedures were together with Zhiwei and based on the discussion with companies. Using these news, we count and compute the negative news variables.
We first collect the news media created or retweeted about the companies that related to the disinformation news. And we compute the variables that means the negative degree of media to the companies:
a: VOLUME OF THE NEGATIVE NEWS ABOUT THE COMPANY (N_Vol_com)
We count the negative news that the media created and retweeted about the related companies. The numbers are the results.
b: NEGATIVE VALENCE ABOUT THE COMPANY (N_Val_com)
We use the ratio of volume of negative news to the total number of news that the media created and retweeted about the related companies.
c: HOSTILE INDEX (HI)
We compute the hostile index as below:
We then collect the news media created or retweeted. And we compute the variables that means the negative degree of media:
d: VOLUME OF THE NEGATIVE NEWS (N_Vol)
We count the negative news that the media created and retweeted. The numbers are the results.
e: NEGATIVE VALENCE (N_Val)
We use the ratio of volume of negative news to the total number of news that the media created and retweeted.
C. EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the disinformation channel, we use the logistic regression as it is proper for binary dependent variable. We analyze different models and explain the binary dependent variable of whether a media has been judged as a disinformation channel or not. Model 1 (Eq. 3) only took into account the media's volume of disinformation as a control variable. Model 1 provides the baseline. Model 2 (Eq. 4) uses all the disinformation variables as the explanatory variable combine with controlling for the disinformation volume. Model 3 (Eq. 5) adds the variables that means the negative degree of medias to companies. At last, Model 4 (Eq. 6) replaces these variables to that means the negative degree of media.
The equations are as:
where F β X = e β X (1+e β X )
Pr (Dis_Channel = 1) = F(constant + β 1 Dis_Score
D. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
To better use the analysis of the variables in order to improve the management of the disinformation, we try to predict whether a media is the disinformation channel of the company. We built different predictive models and evaluate their performance. Toward this end, we use different model configurations incorporating different variables to predict the disinformation channel. Moreover, we evaluate different machine learning models. At last, we validate our results using evaluation methodology in the machine learning field.
1) MODEL CONFIGURATIONS
We use two model configurations. Model configuration A uses both disinformation variables and negative news variables related to the companies, and Model configuration B uses both disinformation variables and negative news variables of media. Particularly, only those variables that are found to have a significant influence on the disinformation channels are considered as predictors. It means that the two configurations built on the results from the explanatory analysis.
2) MACHINE LEARNING MODELS
To find the better way of predicting the disinformation channels, we evaluate the performance of different machine learning models. According to the type of our data, we perform supervised learning based on the pre-labeled data. In this article, as the data size is small, we chose the Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree, Naïve Bayes, and Logistic Regression to be our predictive models.
3) EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES
We evaluate the predictive models using the ten-fold crossvalidation method, which is one of the most commonly used methods when testing the accuracy and stability of a model. The procedures were as follows: First, we divide the data set into ten parts and mark them data 1 , data 2 . . . data 10 . Second, we separately regard the data i = 1, 2 · · · 10 as the testing set, and the other data as the training set. We train the model and compute the results of the model when classifying the testing set. Third, we average the results of the 10 classification which came from step 2. This value was the result of the tenfold cross-validation.
As to the result parameters, we use the Acc (accuracy), Rec (recall), Pre (precision) and F1. They are based on the true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), and false negatives (FN) examples. The calculation measures are presented as below:
Rec = TP TP + FN Table 2 shows the results of the explanatory analysis, in which we first consider the control variable (Model 1) to analyze whether the intuitive approach makes sense. Next, we use the disinformation variables to analyze the effect of disinformation. Lastly, we add the negative news variables to analyze the effect of negative news. Moreover, in this analysis, we both consider the negative effect of media on the company and the negative effect of the media itself. Model 1 (Eq.3) only takes into account the control variable and the volume of the disinformation that media created and retweeted to verify the intuitive approach and to be as a baseline setup. We observe that the volume of disinformation news is associated with the judgment of whether a media is a disinformation channel or not (β =2.755, p<0.001). Consequently, it can be argued that post disinformation news is a characteristic of the disinformation channel. The more disinformation news the media create or retweet, the more probable it is to be a disinformation channel.
IV. RESULTS

A. EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS
Model 2 (Eq.4) focuses on the disinformation variables. We observed a positive impact of the disinformation score on the judgment of the disinformation channel (β =0.611, p<0.001). As the disinformation score represents the severity of the news, it means that, the more severe the disinformation the media create or retweet, the more probable it is to be a disinformation channel.
Model 3 (Eq.5) and Model 4 (Eq.6) provide more comprehensive insights into identifying the characteristics of disinformation channels. They analyze whether the negative news variables of the media can be regarded as the discriminant factors. Model 3 uses the negative news variables of the media to the company. The results indicate that the volume of the company-related negative news (β = 0.021, p<0.001) and the HI (β = 8.195, p = 0.014) have a positive influence on the judgment. Model 4 uses the negative news variables of the media itself. The results indicate that the volume of the negative news that the media create and retweet (β = 0.006, p<0.001) has a positive influence on the judgment. Consequently, we can observe that not only the disinformation news characteristics but also the negative news characteristics are the discriminant factors in judging the disinformation channel. Regarding the overall quality of the models, it can be noted that considering the other disinformation variables improves the model performance compared to Model 1 (Cox & Snell R 2 = +0.014, Nagelkerke R 2 = +0.020). Moreover, taking into account the negative news variables improves the performance.
B. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
On the basis of the analysis above, using significant influencing variables, we give our predictive analysis. The results of the predictive analysis are shown in Table 3 . We can observe that both model configuration A and model configuration B have appreciable performance. The two models have comparable predictive accuracies (up to 94.3%). Regarding the more important indicators, recall and F1, the two models also show comparable results (up to 92.9% recall and 91.0% F1). These results show that it is feasible to identify the disinformation channel by building machine learning models using the variables of disinformation and negative news. For negative news, there is no such difference between company-related variables and media variables.
Regarding the different machine-learning models, we observe that Naïve Bayes has the worst performance. It is not proper to use this algorithm. At the same time, SVM has the best performance. Especially regarding recall and F1, which are the most important indicators in the disinformation channel identification project. The appreciable performance indicates that such predictive algorithm can be used to identify the disinformation channel.
V. DISCUSSION
In this study, we propose a framework to identify disinformation channels. On the basis of the data that we collected and discussed with related companies, and then combined with a machine learning algorithm, we propose the disinformation variables and the negative news variables to form the discriminant system of the disinformation channels.
We first analysed the impact of the disinformation variables (H1). As shown using explanatory analysis, the volume of disinformation has a significant influence on whether a media outlet is a disinformation channel or not. Furthermore, the score of the disinformation has a significant influence. From a managerial standpoint, it means that when we judge or identify media, we should not only take into consideration its disinformation volume but also consider the seriousness of the news. Content analysis will be used in this task in the future.
Meanwhile, as shown using explanatory analysis, we propose that the negative variables also have an impact (H2). The volume of the negative news and HI all has significant influence on judging whether a media outlet is a disinformation channel or not. From a managerial standpoint, it means that when identifying disinformation channels, the company should focus on this negative news. It is perhaps more important than the disinformation news. When creating the disinformation news, companies could warn the media by sending legal notices. These notices may shock these media outlets, as they would probably be sued. Therefore, the volume of disinformation will not be too profuse, unlike creating negative news. The disinformation channels will use negative news to give continuous attack and occasionally use disinformation news to give a periodic but severe attack. Therefore, when companies try to identify or monitor the disinformation channel, they should pay attention to negative news.
Moreover, when comparing the explanatory results of Model 3 and Model 4, we observed that company-related negative news performs comparably to the negative news of media. This means that companies should not just take into consideration the negative news related to itself. Rather, companies should also pay attention to the media that create or retweet negative news, even if this news is not related to the company.
In addition, as shown using predictive analysis, we propose that disinformation news variables and negative news variables have predictive power in the case of judging the disinformation channel. We showed that the models taking into account these variables performed well, especially the SVM algorithm. It proves feasible to identify the disinformation channel, and with the data accumulating, we could ensure better performance.
We are also aware of several limitations. First, we are cognizant that other factors, apart from the disinformation variables and negative news variables, might influence the identification of the disinformation channel. In this article, owing to objective reasons, we do not use company profile data. Second, the dataset is small. The collection of the disinformation is a long-term process. As we just began this task with Zhiwei, the dataset is relatively small. However, this gives us direction to solve this disinformation problem. With time, the more data collected, the more comprehensive the analysis will be.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, to address the management problem of mediacreated disinformation that is harmful to a company, we proposed a disinformation channel framework, which automatically provides a method to identify the media outlet. On the basis of theoretical analysis, we proposed the disinformation variable and negative news variable as characteristics of the disinformation channel. Using the disinformation data in 2018, we conducted explanatory and predictive analyses.
We observed that the volume and score of disinformation are both significantly related to channel identification. Thus, a company should take into account not only the number of media outlets but also the content. Meanwhile, the volume of negative news and HI has also significantly influenced the question. We also observed that the volume of companyrelated negative news media created or retweeted and the volume of negative news media created or retweeted both significantly influence the identification problem. This means that a company should take care of negative news and not just negative news related to themselves. Finally, combined with machine learning, we show that these variables are valuable for providing automatic identification of the disinformation channel about a company in the media.
Through this article, we contributed to the body of knowledge in several ways. First, we contributed to the study of disinformation management. More than controlling the media that create or disseminate the disinformation, we proposed that the disinformation channel gives a direction of solving the disinformation problem. We also contributed to the identification of the obscured disseminators in the dissemination of information disorders. Using this method, we built a detection framework of the obscured disseminators that have no network structure. Finally, we are the first to study the disinformation problem among companies and offer management suggestions.
This study provides several avenues for further research. In this study, we provided a relatively basic identification characteristics framework of the disinformation channel. With the accumulation of data, more characteristics could be used to provide automatic detection. Furthermore, as the disinformation channel of a company continues to accumulate, future research should step into this field to study the impact of these disinformation channels to a company and give proper suggestions to address the impact. Finally, further 29202 VOLUME 8, 2020 research may also combine the detection of a disinformation channel with detection of disinformation in order to give management suggestions for some control from the first instance of dissemination.
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